Neutrality

I contend that the war on terror is a global counter-insurgency. Such efforts have two sides, the hard and soft counter-insurgency. Hard counter-insurgency involves arresting, killing, capturing, or otherwise preventing leaders, cadres, and propagandists from getting their message out, recruiting, or organizing operations. The numbers of such leaders and cadres are inevitably small, and seek to get control of much larger populations. Likewise, attempting to win over these same populations is the effort of the soft counter-insurgency. The billion muslims appear to be more or less neutral in the struggle between Al Qaeda and the West. In democracies we are accustomed to some significant level of popular support for military actions. But not only do the non-democratic states of the Islamic world lack such popular soveriegnty, but Al Qaeda is no state and represents the most radical members of the Salafi Jihad. Four times Al Qaeda has been radicalized by the loss of moderate members who abandon the Jihad. First when the Soviets left Afghanistan volunters went home, their work accomplished. Only the most radical mujahedin and those who were not welcome at home because of their political activities remained. When Al Qaeda moved to Sudan, the movement again lost its least committed members. When Al Qaeda decided to shift from the near enemy to the far enemy, fighters left. And when Al Qaeda returned to Afghanistan, a final portion, again the least committed, left them and did not go to Afghanistan. So this radical movement, built in many ways in the fashion of a Lennist cell, a radical vanguard of revolution disconnected from any population, is at war alone against the Coallition lead by the United States. The prize in this conflict are the people and governments of the Middle East.

John Adams recalled that during the American Revolution, a third supported the revolution, a third supported the crown, and a third was indifferent. Speculating what portion of the Islamic world supports Al Qaeda is guesswork. Many Western observers are disappointed in the limited support which the Muslim world has provided to its cause. It appears that the majority are neutral.

Victory in the war on terror will ultimatly amount to moving this large body of neutrals into the Western camp. The most obvious way to do this is to spread democracy. People undertaking the defense of their democracies will be invested in a way that subjects of Egyptian, Saudi, and other undemocratic regimes are not.

A combination of soft diplomacy, public diplomacy, and a reformist agenda are the soft counter-insurgency which will win the war, a victory made possible by the hard counter-insurgency carried out by the military, special forces, intelligence, and law enforcement. The hard counter-insurgency prevents an Al Qaeda victory and limits their ability to act, while soft counter-insurgency wins for the West.